In nature, the intensity of mate choice (i.e., choosiness) is highly variable within and between 2 sexes. Despite growing empirical evidence showing male and/or mutual mate choice, theoretical investigations of the joint evolution of female and male choosiness are few. In addition, previous 4 approaches have often assumed an absence of trade-off between the direct benefits per mating and the lower mating rate that results from being choosy. Here, we model the joint evolution of 6 female and male choosiness when it is solely ruled by this fundamental trade-off. We show that this trade-off can generate a diversity of stable combinations of choosiness. Mutual mate choice 8 can only evolve if both females and males exhibit long latency after mating. Further, we show that an increase in choosiness in one sex does not necessarily prevent the evolution of mutual 10 mate choice: the outcome depends on details of the life history, the decision rule for mate choice, and how the fecundity of a pair is shaped by the quality of both individuals. Lastly, we discuss 12 the power of the sensitivity of the relative searching time (i.e., of the proportion of lifetime spent searching for mates) as a predictor of the joint evolution of choosiness. 14 2
where µ x,i is the probability that an individual i of the sex x mates, given that it is available for mating and has encountered an individual of sex y. Similarly, the transition rates for individuals 164 of sex y are obtained by substituting x for y in the previous matrix.
Calculating mating probabilities 166 The mating probability µ x,i of an individual i of sex x depends on the probability that it finds the potential mate encountered acceptable, thus on its choosiness (i.e., φ x,i ). In addition, µ x,i depends 168 on the availability of individuals of sex y, that is on the probability that a given individual of sex y is not in latency. This availability is in turn related to the choosiness of other individuals 170 of sex x. The reason is that an individual that is encountered may be in latency after having previously mated -and is thus unavailable for a new mating. To take this competition for mates 172 into account, we consider a mutant individual m with choosiness φ x,m in a population where all other individuals of sex x have choosiness φ x,p (with p for population). We also assume that all 174 individuals of sex y show the same choosiness, denoted φ y,p . Together, φ x,p and φ y,p define the residents in the population.
We now characterize the relationship between the mating probability µ x,m of a mutant of the focal sex and the other parameters. First, µ x,m depends on the quality of the mutant (i.e. q x,m ).
Indeed, if the latter is not of sufficient quality to mate with (i.e., with quality q x,m < q x (φ y,p )), it is never chosen by other-sex individuals and thus its mating probability is null. If so, it does 180 not transmit its choosiness alleles and thus does not influence the evolution of choosiness in the population. Therefore, only mutants who can obtain mates need to be taken into account. Two 182 situations need to be distinguished for such a mutant. First, if it is choosier than other same-sex individuals (φ x,m ≥ φ x,p ), the potential partners it is willing to mate with are also courted by 184 residents and are thus not necessarily available. The availability of such potential partners, that is the probability that any individual i of sex y, with quality q y,i ≥ q y (φ x,p ), is in the available state 186 in eq. 1, is denoted a y,p . Second, if the mutant is less choosy than residents (φ x,m < φ x,p ), it is willing to mate with two types of individuals: those who are also chosen by resident individuals 188 of sex x, whose availability equals a y,p , and those whose quality ranges from q y (φ x,m ) to q y (φ x,p ) and who are thus always available for mating with this mutant. Therefore, we have:
(2)
To characterize the mating probability µ x,p of a focal-sex resident whose quality is sufficient to mate with (i.e., with quality q x,i ≥ q x (φ y,p )), we set φ x,m = φ x,p in the previous equation. We 192 obtain: µ x,p = (1 − φ x,p )a y,p .
(3)
Calculating mating availabilities 194 To obtain the expressions for the mating availability a y,p , we need to compute, in each sex, the expected time spent by resident individuals in latency and to divide it by the expected lifes-196 pan. Because the states of the life cycle considered here forms a Markov chain where death is an absorbing state, the expected time spent in each state can be deduced from the transition probabilities between the non-absorbing states of the life cycle (using D x = (I − L x ) −1 with I the identity matrix and L x from eq. 1, see e.g., Caswell, 2001, p. 112) . Assuming that individuals 200 start their reproductive life available for mating, we can therefore deduce the average number of time steps d (first element of the matrix D x ) that a focal-sex resident spends available for mating 202 throughout lifetime:
By dividing d by the expected lifespan (1/(1 − s x )) and substituting µ x,p for the value obtained 204 from eq. 3, we obtain the probability a x,p which represents the availability of residents of sex x whose quality is sufficient to mate (i.e., with quality q x,i ≥ q x (φ y,p )). Substituting x for y, we 206 similarly obtain the availability a y,p for a resident of sex y whose quality is sufficient to mate (i.e., with quality q y,i ≥ q y (φ x,p )) at a given time step. This leads to the following system of two 208 equations with two unknowns: a y,p = (1 − s y l y )/(1 − s y l y + s y γ(1 − φ y,p )a x,p l y ) a x,p = (1 − s x l x )/(1 − s x l x + s x γ(1 − φ x,p )a y,p l x ) ,
which solution yields: 210 a y,p = 1 2s x γφ x,p l x (1 − s y l y ) s x γl x (s y l y (φ x,p − φ y,p ) − φ x,p )
Exchanging x and y in this expression gives a x,p .
As further computations require the expression of the availability of a mutant m of sex x, we 212 used the same approach to compute a x,m and obtained:
where µ x,m (that is a function of a y,p ) is given by eq. 2.
214
Computing the expected lifetime fecundity of a mutant 216 Let us define the lifetime fecundity of an individual i as the number of offspring it produces as a result of all mating events. We define the expected lifetime fecundity as the lifetime fecundity 218 computed in a lineage of individuals. That is, the expected lifetime fecundity is computed over the distribution of contexts in which an individual of this lineage could be. To obtain this expected 220 lifetime fecundity, we first compute the expected fecundity F x (q x,i ) of an individual i of sex x given its quality q x,i . Then, we will compute its expectation over the distribution of quality of q x,i .
222
For these computations, we assume that the number of offspring obtained from any mating (i.e., the benefits per mating) depends neither on the number of previous matings nor on the number 224 of offspring obtained from these previous matings. Therefore, by Wald's formula for optional stopping (e.g., Durrett, 2010, p. 185), F x (q x,i ) is the product of the individual's mating rate (r x,i ), 226 its expected benefits per mating (integrated over the distribution of each partner's quality) which we call b(q x,i ), and its expected lifetime (1/(1 − s x )):
To compute the expected benefits per mating b(q x,i ), we assume the reproductive success of a mating pair to be equal to the mean of qualities of the two members of the pair, which makes it 230 linear in the individual quality q x,i and in the expected quality q y (i) of its mates:
The fact that all individuals of sex y are assumed to have the same choosiness (see above)
232 implies that among individuals with different q x,i above the threshold of sex y, r x,i is independent of q x,i , and individuals of lower quality never mate. Further, q y (i) differs among individuals 234 with different choosiness but is identical among individuals with the same choosiness. Thus the expected lifetime fecundity F x,m among all mutants representing a mutant lineage can be written
in terms of expected mating rate r x,m , and expected benefits per mating b x,m , of mutants. We will 238 now detail expressions for these expectations.
The expected mating rate r x,m of a focal-sex mutant equals its availability (a x,m ) multiplied 240 by the probability that it finds an individual of the other sex and mates with it at this time step (s x γµ x,m ). From eq. 7, this is:
From the expression for µ x,m (eq. 2), this becomes:
The expected benefits per mating of a mutant is the mean of the respective terms in eq. 9, 244 which we write (q x,m + q y )/2. Because other-sex resident individuals accept any focal-sex individual whose quality is higher than q x (φ y,p ), the expected quality of the mutant q x,m is the mean 246 of the quality distribution in sex x restricted to the range between q x (φ y,p ) and 1. This can be written:
where f x (q) denotes the probability density of quality in sex x, and where the denominator of the right-hand side results from the definition of φ y,p as the proportion of other-sex individuals 250 whose quality is too low to be accepted as mates.
We need to distinguish two cases when computing the expected quality of the mutant's mate 252 (q y ). First, if the mutant is choosier than resident individuals of its sex (φ x,m ≥ φ x,p ), it accepts any individual of sex y whose quality is higher than q y (φ x,m ). In this case, the expected quality of its 254 mates is thus the mean of the quality distribution in sex y restricted to the range between q y (φ x,m ) and 1. Second, if the mutant is less choosy than resident individuals of its sex (φ x,m < φ x,p ), it 256 can mate with two types of individuals who differ in their availabilities: those whose quality ranges from q y (φ x,m ) to q y (φ x,p ) (who are always available) and those whose quality is higher 258 than q y (φ x,p ) (who are also courted by focal-sex resident individuals and thus are available with probability a y,p ). In this case, the expected quality of the mates of the mutant is thus the mean of 260 the quality distribution in the sex y restricted to the range between q y (φ x,m ) and 1, weighted by the respective availabilities of the two kinds of potential mates. By denoting f y (q) the density of 262 the distribution of quality in sex y, we therefore have:
The general expression for the expected benefits per mating of a mutant is the average of the 264 expressions for q x,m and q y :
In some particular cases, the expected benefits per mating of a mutant (b x,m ) take a simple 266 form. For example, if the mutant is choosier than the resident (i.e., φ x,m ≥ φ x,p ) and if quality is uniformly distributed in both sexes (i.e., f x (q) and f y (q) are the beta distribution with α x = 268 β x = α y = β y = 1), then the expected quality of the focal-sex mutant lineage and of mates are respectively (1 + φ y,p )/2 and (1 + φ x,m )/2 (as q(φ) = φ under the uniform distribution). In this 270 case, the expected benefits per mating of the mutant is simply given by:
Analytical study of the model
The full analytical methods are described in Supplementary Information, but all key steps will 274 be presented here. We first assessed the existence of a joint equilibrium for choosiness (i.e., a situation in which both sexes are simultaneously at an equilibrium for choosiness) and studied its convergence and evolutionary stability (sensu Eshel, 1996) using standard methods from adaptive dynamics (Metz et al., 1996; Rousset, 2004) . A joint equilibrium, if it exists, corresponds to the 278 joint solution (φ * x , φ * y ) of the following system:
We identified such a solution and studied the convergence stability in each sex before investi-280 gating the joint convergence stability. The study of the joint convergence stability required the additional assumption of independent mutational effects between females and males. We also 282 assessed the evolutionary stability in cases for which φ * y = 0. We could not verify this property when non-zero choosiness is selected in both sexes, as we are not aware of the existence of any 284 general method allowing for the assessment of the joint evolutionary stability of several evolving traits.
286
Second, we analyzed the effect of a change z in a given biological or ecological variable on the equilibrium for choosiness in sex x, while assuming that other-sex choosiness remains fixed at 288 the equilibrium value reached before the change happens (i.e., φ y,p = φ * y ). This implies the study of the effect of a change in z on the mating rate and/or the expected benefits per mating near 290 φ * x (but not on the expected lifetime because this latter is not related to choosiness). Indeed, at equilibrium we can rewrite eq. 10 as:
where ∂ + represents the right derivative (i.e., we consider the case φ x,m ≥ φ x,p in eqs. 12 & 15, but considering the other case leads to same results as shown in Supplementary Information), R * 
The term ∂RST * x /∂z r (which is more compactly denoted ∂RST) corresponds to the sensitivity of 304 RST of the sex x with respect to z r , i.e., the variation in the relative searching time caused by the change in z r while choosiness remains fixed in both sexes.
306
When z influences the expected benefits per mating only (hereafter called z b ), we also demonstrate in Supplementary Information that the effect of a change in z b on the evolution of focal-sex choosiness can be deduced from the effect of z b on B * x :
In this situation, we did not find a simple metric such as ∂RST to summarize the effect of a change in z b .
308
Third, we analyzed the effect of a change in z on the joint equilibrium for choosiness. Indeed, in the analyzes used to obtain eqs. 19 and 20 we only considered the direct effect of z on φ * x while 310 φ * y remains fixed, but z can also influences φ * y , and φ * y could in turn also influence φ * x . Formally, the total variation of the choosiness in both sexes following a change in z is described by the 312 system:
where dφ * x /dz (dφ * y /dz) represents the total variation of the choosiness in the sex x (y) that 314 includes the effect of z on the choosiness of both sexes and ∂φ * x /∂φ *
We have already described the analysis of dφ * x /dz in terms of R * x and B * x , so the same goes for dφ * y /dz (swapping x and y). To study ∂φ * x /∂φ * y we would similarly consider the changes in R * x 318 and B * x caused by a change in φ y,p . However, no more definite analytical result could be obtained for ∂φ * x /∂φ * y and thus for the overall effect of z on the joint equilibrium for choosiness.
320

Numerical analysis
Despite the simplicity of the life cycle we consider, some mathematical complexity emerges be-322 cause of the joint evolution between sexes. As a consequence, some specific results cannot be analytically derived from the equations presented above. We thus complemented the analysis of 324 our model by computing the numerical solution of our analytical equations using the software R (R Core Team, 2015). To minimize the risk of missing exceptions to our main conclusions, we 326 investigated a large number of parameter sets.
To study equilibrium conditions for each choosiness, we considered the 16 possible combi-328 nations between 4 different quality distributions for females and males: uniform (α = β = 1), bell-curve (α = β = 4), left-skewed (α = 4 and β = 10) and right-skewed (α = 10 and β = 4). For 330 each of these 16 cases, we generated two tables of 10 5 combinations of the other parameters (γ, s x , s y , l x and l y ): one for which values for each parameter were randomly drawn from a uniform 332 distribution between 0 and 1 (that we call the "continuous tables"), and the other for which all combinations of values among the following range were considered: 0.001, 0.1, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 334 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 0.999 (that we call the "discrete tables"). In total we therefore analyzed 3.2 × 10 6 (= 16 × 10 5 × 2) different parameter sets. 336 We also used the continuous tables to study the joint evolution of choosiness between sexes.
The procedure is described in figure 4 . 338 Finally, we studied the predictive power of ∂RST numerically. To do so, we first randomly drew 10 6 pairs of parameters sets differing in the value of only one parameter, from each of 340 the 16 discrete tables. For each pair of parameter sets we computed the partial variation of choosiness, the total variation of choosiness and ∂RST. Second, we then randomly drew 10 6 pairs 342 of parameters sets (which could here potentially differ in γ, s x , s y , l x and l y ) from the same discrete tables. We computed again the partial variation of choosiness, the total variation of choosiness 344 and ∂RST for all these pairs. We were therefore able to determine the predictive power of ∂RST when only one parameter changes, as well as when all parameters are free to change at the same 346 time, using 1.6 × 10 7 (= 16 × 10 6 ) different parameter sets in each case. The numerical analysis of the predictive power of ∂RST was not replicated using the continuous 
Results
Scope 352 We will indicate below whether a given result has been analytically obtained (hereafter labeled as analytical result), if it has been obtained for the complete numerical exploration (numerical 354 result), or if it has been obtained numerically and correspond to an effect found in only part of the parameter space (restricted result). Numerical results are consistent across the entire numerical 356 exploration and are likely to be as general as our analytical derivations, that is, true within the scope of the assumptions made in this model. Yet, because this statement cannot be proven 358 without being able to apply a pure analytical approach, we chose to make the distinction between numerical and analytical results explicit.
360
The evolution of mutual mate choice Result 1. There is always one and only one convergence stable (joint) equilibrium for choosiness 362 both in situation of unilateral and mutual mate choice (numerical result).
We numerically solved equilibrium eq. 17 for the 3.2 × 10 6 parameter sets and found that there 364 is always one single combination of choosiness that satisfies the equilibrium condition (numerical result). For these 3.2 × 10 6 equilibria we found only two outcomes for both convergence and Cases of mutual mate choice at equilibrium (φ * x > 0 and φ * y > 0) are highly diverse within 378 our numerical exploration, ranging from very low (e.g., φ * = 0.01) to very high (e.g., φ * = 0.7)
choosiness in both sexes, with all possible intermediates (e.g., see figure 1 ). in both sexes is not sufficient to observe mutual mate choice at equilibrium. Indeed, the latter outcome is obtained only when both latency and survival rates approach 1 in the two sexes (see
Once this criterion is satisfied, the level of mutual choosiness at equilibrium is influenced by other parameters. In particular, high choosiness in both sexes is favored when 390 encounter rate and/or variance in quality of both sexes is high, and/or mean quality of both sexes is low (figures S4-S6).
392
The joint evolution of choosiness Result 4. An increase in choosiness in one sex decreases both the cost and the benefit of being From the definition of R * x (see eq. 18) and the expression for r x,m (see eq. 12), the effect of a 396 change in other sex choosiness (i.e., φ y,p ) upon the cost R * x of being choosy is:
When φ y,p increases, fewer individuals of the focal sex mate, which increases the availability a y,p 398 of other-sex individuals whose quality is sufficient to mate. Thus the partial derivative of R * x with respect to φ y,p is also positive (analytical result). Therefore, an increase in φ y,p selects for higher 400 focal-sex choosiness via its effect on the relative change in mating rate (see eq. 19). Simply put, the increasing availability in the sex y, as a consequence of the higher choosiness in this sex, reduces 402 the competition among individuals of sex x for the access to other-sex individuals. Thereby the cost of being choosy in sex x reduces, which is why φ y,p has, here, a positive effect on φ * x .
404
From the definition of B * x (see eq. 18), the effect of a change in other sex choosiness (i.e., φ y,p ) upon the benefit B * x of being choosy can generally be written
(23)
The mixed derivative of b x,m vanishes (from eq. 15), so that this reduces to
When φ y,p increases, the mean quality of focal-sex individuals whose quality is sufficient to mate 408 increases (see eq. 13), and thus the expected benefits per mating b x,m increases as well (see eq. 15).
Then, b x,m also increases with φ x,m (see eq. 15). Both derivatives in the right-hand term of the Had we assumed the reproductive success of a mating pair to be equal to the product of qualities of the two members of the pair (b x,m = q x,m q y ), instead of its average (eq. 9), then an 418 increase in other-sex choosiness could have only selected for a higher choosiness in the focal sex (analytical result). Indeed, instead of eq. 24, eq. 23 would then lead to:
because q x,m is not a function of φ x,m (see eq. 13) and q y is not a function of φ y,p (see eq. 14). Therefore, the negative effect caused by the influences of φ y,p on the benefit of being choosy vanishes 422 and other-sex choosiness would thus no longer exert a negative effect on focal-sex choosiness.
Under this alternative assumption, an increase in φ y,p would thus always lead to an increase in 424 φ * x (analytical result).
Result 5. An increase in choosiness in one sex does not necessarily prevent the evolution of 426 choosiness in the other (restricted result).
We have numerically found that when latency rate is low (< 0.7) in both sexes, the negative effect 428 of φ * y on φ * x is always larger than its positive effect (numerical result, figure 4 ). However, this result is restricted when latency is high in both sexes, which corresponds to cases of mutual mate choice 430 at equilibrium (see figure 1 ). In this latter situation, parameter values determine which of the two antagonistic effects of φ * y on φ * x can outweigh the other (figure 4).
Discussion
In this article, we have modeled the direct selection of choosiness when mate choice is allowed 468 to evolve in both sexes by considering that mate choice is solely associated with direct benefits in terms of increased mate quality and costs in terms of reduced mating rate. We have neglected 470 all other selection pressures (e.g., indirect benefits, energy and predation costs induced by mate search, sexual conflicts) and all other evolutionary forces (e.g., drift, migration, recombination).
472
Under these conditions, we derived the complete analytical expression of individual fecundities and obtained most of our results based on the numerical evaluation of our analytical expressions. . We now discuss these results in more detail before examining some key assumptions of our model. An increase in choosiness in the other sex does not only decrease the cost of being choosy for 580 the focal sex. It also decreases its benefit of being choosy. Indeed, we found that an increase in other-sex choosiness has a positive impact on the mean quality of individuals qualifying as mates 582 in the focal sex, which in turn leads to a reduction of the benefit of being choosy (i.e., the relative increase in benefits per mating with choosiness) in this focal sex (analytical result). In most of the 584 numerical cases that we have explored, this negative effect on the benefit of being choosy is larger than the cost (Result 5: restricted), which leads choosiness to decrease in one sex when it increases 586 in the other sex.
Nevertheless, the opposite result can be observed, in particular when latency is high in both The power of ∂RST as a predictor for the evolution of choosiness must be assessed 606 empirically
We assessed whether one can qualitatively predict an evolutionary change in choosiness triggered 608 by any factor z r influencing the mating rate of individuals. We found that this is indeed the case, but only under specific conditions. Etienne et al. (2014) showed that one can qualitatively predict 610 an evolutionary change in choosiness triggered by any factor z r that influences the mating rate of individuals when the other sex is constrained to be indiscriminate. They found that the sign of where C produces an erroneous prediction). This weakness emerges from the fact that C, as with 638 the OSR in many models, is considered as fixed (i.e., it depends only on the parameter setting) and does not covary with the evolution of choosiness. Our metric, ∂RST does not suffer from this In the absence of further developments, we therefore believe that ∂RST, albeit imperfect, re-650 mains the best available predictor of the evolution of choosiness because (i) it holds across a wide range of mating systems, (ii) it encompasses many alternative variables proposed thus far to ex-652 plain the evolution of choosiness by direct selection (i.e., the time invested in breeding, the adult sex-ratio, the operational sex-ratio, and the cost of breeding; see Etienne et al., 2014) and (iii) it 654 can be used empirically to infer qualitative differences in choosiness. We therefore encourage the use of ∂RST to study the evolution of choosiness in nature both in unilateral and mutual mate of RST (e.g., the time spent sampling mates or courting), and measure this proxy before and after the variable considered has changed (naturally or during the course of an experiment). Then, the difference between the two estimations of RST provide the estimation of ∂RST. The main empirical constraint is that the first measurement has to be done in a situation in which choosiness is as 662 close as possible to its evolutionary equilibrium in both sexes, and the second before choosiness changes (because of selection or phenotypic plasticity).
664
Such an experimental protocol aims at predicting the evolution of choosiness in the face of environmental change. If an increase in choice is predicted in one or both sexes, it could also be 666 useful to determine whether the sexual selection predicted to act on mate choice will be strong enough to overcome the influence of other potentially conflicting selection pressures, as well as 668 that of other evolutionary forces. One possibility is to couple the experimental design outlined above with an empirical study in which the environment is maintained constant, the choosiness 
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Our work should also stimulate empirical perspectives that do not involve ∂RST. In particular, a precise characterization of the fundamental trade-off of choice in different species would allow 676 the quantification of the direct cost of being choosy, and thereby the assessment of the importance of this trade-off. We are well aware that the empirical assessment of any trade-off is notoriously 678 difficult, however as it has been shown with respect to other questions it is generally worth pursuing (Stearns, 1989) . Here, the main difficulty will be -as for the measurement of sexual 680 selection discussed above -to modify the choosiness of individuals without impacting on other parameters influencing the trade-off.
682
A critical evaluation of the assumptions of the model
In our model, we have made simplifying assumptions in order to conserve some analytical 684 tractability and thus be able to make general predictions. This naturally raises the question of how robust these predictions are when extended to more realistic and/or specific situations.
686
Due to the complexity of the model, making verbal predictions of the effect of relaxing the key assumptions is highly speculative. Therefore, we encourage theoreticians to build on our formal-688 ism to study the effect of some key assumptions that we made for the sake of simplicity. For example, we neglected condition dependence at all levels: choosiness, survival, latency and en- A second assumption in our model is that we only consider the evolution of choosiness. that allow female invertebrates to store sperm (Simmons, 2001) , or of behaviors such as mate switching during amplexus in male Gammarids (Galipaud et al., 2015) . A trivial prediction is 716 that the evolution of such traits should facilitate the evolution of choosiness (in females and males, respectively), but the real question is under which circumstances these adaptations will 718 evolve despite their costs once the benefits of choice are taken into account.
In our model, we have assumed no indirect benefits. This assumption was necessary to study 720 precisely the direct cost that increased choosiness may exert upon the mating rate. Indirect benefits may however occur in nature and strongly influence the joint evolution of mate choice, Finally, we shall discuss one assumption we made that may a priori appear limiting but that 732 may not be necessary so: in the real world, latency is not necessarily all-or-nothing in living organisms as assumed in our model, but more likely to vary continuously (one can be more or contrast with our assumption. However, in our model latency is not all-or-nothing for a group of individuals. This is true in particular for all individuals sharing an allele for choosiness because 738 these individuals will each leave latency at different random times. Hence, selection will be similar at the level of choosiness alleles whether or not latency is, at a given time, all-or-nothing
In this paper, we studied how the choosiness of males and females jointly evolve when selection pressures acting on this trait are only shaped by the fundamental trade-off of mate choice: that is the 744 trade-off between the direct benefits individuals gain from choosing their mates and the decrease in mating rate that individuals suffer when they are choosy. We have found that this simple 746 scenario is sufficient to derive several results previously associated with more complex biological assumptions. Contrary to previous claims, we have also revealed that an increase in choosiness in 748 one sex does not necessarily prevent the evolution of mutual mate choice. Indeed, we showed that whether the feedback between the evolution of male and female choosiness promotes or impedes Our approach reinforces the view that one does not need to enforce any intrinsic difference 758 between the sexes in a model to study "sex roles" (i.e., the partition of choosiness and care between females and males). Indeed, we have not constrained life history parameters to particular values 
